We analyze a firm that produces a final good from multiple intermediates that can each be sourced domestically or from a low-wage country. The model explicitly incorporates that sourcing decisions of intermediates are interdependent. Equilibrium predictions depend crucially on a key modeling assumptionthe nature of the trade friction that foreign production has to overcome. If production abroad involves a fixed cost, offshoring one intermediate unambiguously facilitates offshoring of other intermediates. However, if production abroad involves incomplete contracts, offshoring one intermediate almost always makes it more difficult to offshore others. We illustrate that the pattern in prices at which successive automotive parts are imported into the U.S. accords better with the predictions of the incomplete contracting model, except for a few countries with the best governance indicators.
Introduction
International trade in manufactured products has been growing rapidly for decades and intermediate inputs make up an increasing share of it. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) illustrate that the value share of imported intermediates in exports has increased by more than 30% from 1970 to 1990. Antràs (2003) further highlights that almost half of all trade in manufactures takes place within firm boundaries. Both patterns suggest an important role for international fragmentation of production.
Some worry that this process is accelerating as new producers are rapidly being integrated in global production networks and even production of advanced products switches to low-cost destinations. Because demand for different intermediates is interrelated through final product demand, their sourcing decisions are naturally connected. The particular question we pose is whether past decisions to offshore production of fast-maturing parts leads firms to advance or delay offshoring of subsequent parts.
We first study theoretically how the offshoring decisions of different intermediates influence each other in a model that generates a product life-cycle. Production switches from high-wage to low-wage locations as goods mature and inputs are standardized. Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) have argued that theoretical insights depend crucially on proper modeling of the organizational aspects of production.
We demonstrate that two alternative ways of introducing the cost of producing in the low-wage location-using incomplete contracts or fixed costs-lead to opposing predictions. We then investigate which modeling assumption leads to predictions most in line with the empirical patterns for U.S. imports of automotive parts.
The contribution of our study is threefold. First, we distinguish explicitly between final goods and intermediates and show how this leads to interdependent sourcing decisions. Our approach is closest to the incomplete contracting model in Antràs (2005) that generates an endogenous production life-cycle. 1 Formal contract enforcement tends to be weaker in less developed countries, making it more difficult to specify supplier investment and remuneration contractually (Nunn 2007) . The cost advantage of low-wage (South) countries is balanced by a production inefficiency as the contracting friction leads to underinvestment in specific inputs. Only when products have matured sufficiently does it become profitable to produce them in a low-wage location. When we add intermediate products to this model, the offshoring decisions become interdependent because substituting between interme-
1 The property rights model has been a popular framework to study offshoring. Most existing models assume that decisions are made for each product independently (Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Feenstra and Hanson, 2005; Grossman and Helpman, 2005) . The model in Spencer and Qiu (2001) features multiple inputs, but outsourcing decisions are still made for each one individually.
diates is harder than substituting between final products. 2 A few studies have looked at such dependency, relying on mechanisms that are arguably less relevant in the context of cost-driven offshoring. The need to disclose sensitive business information or coordinate production decisions introduces a direct complementarity between outsourcing decisions of different intermediates in Novak and Stern (2009) . The externality is indirect in the model of Acemoglu, Antràs, and Helpman (2007) where aggregate output is increasing in the total number of intermediates, which is interpreted as the level of technology. In the models of Bartel, Lach, and Sicherman (2005) and Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2011) the interaction is between sourcing decisions of different single-product firms.
The second contribution is to show that the standard neoclassical framework, where offshoring is driven by technology or cost considerations, can generate the same endogenous production life-cycle as the incomplete contracting model. If technology differed across countries, a per-unit offshoring cost would be enough to generate an interesting model, as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) . We assume all countries use the same technology, but introduce a fixed cost for each intermediate that is produced in the low-wage location, as in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) or Nocke and Yeaple (2008) . We again find that a product is only offshored after it has matured sufficiently, when variable cost savings outweigh the additional fixed cost.
Introducing intermediates in this alternative framework leads to starkly different predictions. In a model where South production involves a fixed cost, offshoring is accelerating. Intermediates that mature later, move to the low-cost production location at an earlier stage of maturity, i.e. when they still require relatively more high-skill inputs. In contrast, in a model where South production involves incomplete contracts, the reverse pattern applies in most cases. Offshoring becomes gradually more difficult. Intermediates that mature later, need to reach a higher level of maturity before they are profitably produced in the low-cost location.
Our third contribution is to use these models to shed light on the following patterns in the trade data that are shared by many industries and countries. The top panel in Figure 1 illustrates that U.S. imports of automotive components from four Asian countries with emerging auto sectors has risen almost exponentially between 1995 and 2006. The bottom panel illustrates that this growth in value has coincided with a large increase in the number of different components imported into the United States. 3 2 Recent papers by Antràs and Chor (2010) and Schwarz and Suedekum (2010) also focus on supply chain choices, but use models with constant cost-savings from offshoring.
3 Products are defined at the H.S. 10-digit level. Details on the data and the sample are provided in Section 4 where we test between two predictions of the two models we develop first. Average (export value) China (value) S. Korea (value) India (value) Thailand (value) China (parts) S. Korea (parts) India (parts) Thailand (parts)
The attractiveness of foreign sourcing is clearly rising over time, even at an increasing rate. Rising productivity and falling unit costs in foreign sectors are partial explanations, but unlikely to account for the entire increase. In our model, the decision to import one component from abroad changes the profitability of importing other components as well. We naturally expect that more sophisticated components will only be imported at a later time, but it is an open question whether they should mature less or more than earlier products before sourcing from a low-wage location becomes profitable. In the automotive sector it is notoriously difficult to substitute between suppliers (Clark and Fujimoto 1991) and the interdependencies in the model are likely to be important.
To test between the opposing predictions derived from the two modeling assumptions, we need information on the order in which parts mature and on the maturity reached by each part when sourcing switches. A ranking of parts that applies to all countries is recovered using the method in Feenstra and Rose (2000) . As a proxy for the maturity level of each imported part, we calculate the difference between its import price and the corresponding import prices from a few advanced countries. We only use this ratio in the first year the United States imports a particular component from a country to proxy for the maturity threshold when sourcing switches. Time and country fixed effects are included in the analysis to control for wage differences.
We find that the patterns in automotive components trade tend to be most supportive of the incomplete contracts assumption, especially for countries with poor governance according to the World Bank indicators.
The paper is organized along the lines of the three contributions. In Section 2 we add intermediates to the incomplete contracting model of Antràs (2005) and illustrate the interdependence of sourcing decisions. In Section 3 we show that a much simpler model with a fixed cost for foreign production also leads to a production life-cycle, but the interaction of the sourcing decisions with intermediates is starkly different. In Section 4 we compare the predictive power of both models using data on U.S. automotive parts imports. Section 5 conclusions with a summary of findings and with a few broader implications.
2 An incomplete contracting model of outsourcing
Setup
We first study interdependent sourcing by adding a layer of intermediates into the model of Antràs (2005 We follow Antràs (2005) by assuming an iso-elastic demand for the final product:
R is the sales revenue and β > 0 implies that final products are substitutes. 4 The novelty in our model is that the final good y is produced from several intermediates y k , with k = 1, ..., K. Rather than deciding the sourcing of the final good directly, the firm needs to make sourcing decisions for all intermediates.
Production is according to a constant elasticity of substitution technology with 4 A love-of-variety Dixit-Stiglitz utility function over varieties can rationalize this demand. We study only one variety and normalize the constant term to simplify some of the expressions below. constant returns to scale:
Intermediates are indexed by k. α ≤ β implies that it is more difficult for the firm to substitute between intermediates than it is for consumers to substitute between final products. Implicitly, this is what defines intermediates. In the short run it is difficult to change a product's design and substitute between its components in production. If α < 0 the intermediates are complements, while for α > 0 they are substitutes. 5 If α = β the difference between intermediates and final product varieties vanishes and the sourcing pattern in our model becomes identical to that in Antràs (2005) .
Each intermediate is itself produced with a constant returns to scale CobbDouglas production technology:
The high and low-skill inputs x h and x l are interpreted as specific investments. 6
The firm chooses x h directly, with each unit produced using one unit of North labor.
It can choose to source x l from a North supplier, in which case it can specify the level directly and reward the North supplier for its production costs. If it chooses to source x l from South, the weaker contract environment makes it impossible to specify contractually the supplier's investment and remuneration. The South supplier will choose x l non-cooperatively and bargain with the firm over the ex-post division of the quasi-rents.
Wages in North are normalized to unity and South wages are strictly lower. The relative South wage is w ≡ w S /w N < 1. Sourcing an intermediate from South involves a trade-off between cheaper low-skill inputs and a production inefficiency due to noncooperative input choices. The low-skill input elasticity z k will play a key role as the advantage of sourcing intermediate k from South increases with z k .
The international trade literature has used several variations of the property rights model, see Helpman (2006) for an overview. In the model analyzed in Antràs (2005) there are two possible organizational forms in South: (i) an arms-length relationship between the firm and the South supplier with equal bargaining power and no secondary markets and (ii) an FDI structure where the South supplier is a 5 An extreme case is the Leontief production technology, the limiting case for α → −∞. Intermediates that are close substitutes, e.g. red and blue paint, are aggregated in one intermediate. 6 The k index is omitted for x kl and x kh wherever it is obvious.
subsidiary and the firm still has access to a fraction δ of the low-skill input off the equilibrium path. Both forms can be nested in a more general bargaining model with a share m going to the supplier and the balance to the firm (Antràs and Helpman 2004) . To focus on our main contribution, we only consider the case of m = 1/2, which is equivalent to the arms-length organization in Antràs (2005) . 7 In terms of terminology, each final good y is composed of K intermediates y k , which are themselves produced with two inputs x h and x l . 
Firm behavior
The model is solved backwards as follows. In the third stage, past input choices determine the output of all intermediates and the final product. Given the assumptions of monopolistic competition and CES demand, the optimal price is a constant markup over marginal cost. In the second stage, input levels are chosen while taking the impact on outputs of all intermediates and the slope of final product demand into account. This choice is taken differently for intermediates sourced in North or South. In the first stage, the firm selects the sourcing configuration, i.e. one location for each intermediate, that maximizes its profits over all possible configurations.
(a) North suppliers For North suppliers contracts are complete and inputs x h and x l can be considered as chosen directly by the firm that produces the final product to maximize its profit.
The first order condition for each input equalizes its marginal revenue product to the marginal cost:
Dividing the two first order conditions reveals that the firm will always produce at a point where
and the production cost is constant at c N k = 1 (= AC N = M C N ). Equation (4) determines the input mix for the two inputs, while the absolute input levels are determined by equating the marginal revenue contribution of intermediate k to its marginal cost:
This condition will be taken into account when determining the optimal price of the final good, which pins down the optimal quantity and implicitly also the output of all intermediates.
(b) South suppliers For South suppliers contracts are incomplete and the firm and its supplier will choose inputs noncooperatively. Payoffs are determined in an ex-post bargaining game over the surplus generated with the specific inputs with both parties assigned equal bargaining strength. For the supplier, we use the standard assumption that there are no secondary markets for its input, which puts its outside option to zero.
To facilitate the exposition, we assume that the firm has the option of using a generic intermediate k.
It is never used in equilibrium, but if it were the sales revenue net of the cost of the generic intermediate R would be independent of the specific inputs x kl and x kh . The difference between R and R is positive and equals the quasi-rent from this one bilateral relationship. Introducing R leaves the rent associated with other intermediates outside the bargaining with the supplier of k. 8
The Nash bargaining solution is obtained if the firm and supplier choose inputs to maximize the following profits:
Firm: max
Noncooperative choices of x h and x l lead to the following first order conditions:
Dividing the two illustrates that the optimal input mix still equates the relative productivities to the relative wage:
Optimal pricing and output is again determined by the demand function and the first order conditions for all k, which for a South-sourced intermediate equals
With incomplete contracts, the firm and supplier choose input levels below first best as they bear the full cost but only receive one half of the proceeds. Underinvestment drives a wedge between the marginal revenue product of intermediate k and the (efficient) marginal production cost. With equal bargaining weight, only one half of the marginal revenue is taken into account and output will be inefficiently low.
From the final good producer's point of view the relevant marginal cost of procuring input k in South is twice the production cost:
Only when z k is sufficiently high will marginal procurement costs for intermediate k be lower in South.
An additional benefit of South sourcing is the lump sum transfer that the firm receives when it selects a South supplier. This payment accomplishes that in equilibrium South suppliers receive their reservation wage w S for all low-skill inputs they provide and all ex-post rents accrue to the firm (Helpman, 2006) . If the input mix is undistorted, which will be the case with equal bargaining strengths, the average cost of sourcing intermediate k from South will equal the production cost
The marginal cost exceeds the average by a factor of two and the difference contributes to profits. 9
9 Unequal bargaining strength for the firm and the supplier, indicated by 1 − m and m, would lead to a number of differences: (i) The relative productivities are equalized to w(1 − m)/m and the input-mix is distorted as the firm and supplier underinvest to different extents. (ii) Actual production costs differ from c
, which can be higher or lower than the efficient production cost c S k . (v) The implicit markup over the procurement cost depends on the maturity of South-sourced intermediate, rather than equalling (1/β) (see below). For m < 1/2, the equilibrium markup rises with maturity. The low bargaining weight of the supplier makes its underinvestment ever more costly and production increasingly inefficient as the part matures. The firm prefers to extract more profit per output rather than (1) and the production function (2) in the first order conditions we can write
M C averages the procurement cost of all intermediates as a CES price index:
, where M C N or M C S l as defined in the two previous sections is used depending on the sourcing of each intermediate l.
The optimal output of intermediate k is naturally declining in M C k . With α < β it is also declining in the marginal cost of other inputs (cross-cost effect). Even though an increase in M C l leads to substitution towards intermediate k in the production of the final good, this effect is outweighed by the lower sales of the final product as the cost increase raises the final product price. The substitution effect away from the final good that contains both intermediates k and l dominates the substitution between k and l. Stronger substitution between intermediates (α closer to β) strengthens the own-cost effect, but diminishes the cross-cost effect.
Given the CES demand assumption and monopolistic competition in the final good market, optimal price setting for the final product will be p * = M C/β and total variable profits are (1 − β)R. The marginal cost of the final product equals ( k M C k y k )/y. Through M C k it depends directly on the sourcing decisions of all intermediates (North or South) and there is an additional indirect effect through the relative importance of each input (y k /y). A specific feature of the incomplete contracting model is that the ex-ante payments from South suppliers also contribute to profits. They equal the difference between the marginal and average procurement cost for an intermediate sourced in South.
Combining both contributions, we obtain
increase output. The underproduction of y k is proportional to the deviation of m z (1 − m) 1−z from unity, making it optimal eventually to give more bargaining power to the supplier. The option of first producing in South using FDI and switching to an arms-length sourcing relationship for more mature intermediates in Antràs (2005) accomplishes just this.
Substituting in the definitions for the average costs and the output level of intermediates, and using n S to indicate the number of South-sourced intermediates gives optimal profits in the incomplete contracting case as
We can divide the first term by M C − α 1−α such that it is a weighted average of the two price-cost markups. The second expression then amounts to total revenue, which can be seen by substituting the definition of
Equilibrium
Conditional on the maturities of all intermediates, a 1 × K vector of z k values, we can evaluate the above profit expression for each possible sourcing configuration.
The sourcing equilibrium chosen by the firm in the first stage of the model is simply the one yielding the highest profits out of the 2 K possible configurations.
Among the different sourcing configurations with n S intermediates in South, it is profit maximizing to source the n S intermediates with the highest z indices in South. 10 The optimal sourcing configuration conditional on the vector of maturities can then simply be characterized by n * S , the number of intermediates sourced in South. It will satisfy the following condition:
n * S can be found by evaluating profits only for the K relevant configurations, always sourcing the j intermediates with highest z values in South.
All possible equilibria in the two-intermediate case
Now that we know how to find the sourcing equilibrium for any vector of maturities, we want to characterize how the equilibrium configurations vary with maturity levels. In particular, we want to study how the sourcing decision of one intermediate depends on the sourcing of other intermediates. In the next section we demonstrate a few general properties. To provide intuition, we first illustrate graphically the 10 We show in Appendix A.2 that the derivative of profits with respect to the maturity z of an intermediate sourced in South is positive, while it does not vary with the maturity of parts sourced in North. In the extreme case of α = β, the equilibrium is always the same as in Antràs (2005) . When the sourcing of the first intermediate changes, there is no effect on the derived demand for the second intermediate. Substitution by the firm between different intermediates of the same final product is exactly offset by substitution between different final products by consumers. As a result, optimal sourcing for each part is independent of the maturity or sourcing location of the other part. 11
The threshold maturity values that make the firm indifferent between sourcing a part in North or South are the black straight lines; z * 1 and z * 2 both equal the same constant. 12 lower maturity level than would be the case for independent products. We explain this at some length because it provides an important insight into the mechanics of the model (affecting all sourcing decisions).
The thought experiment in Figure 2 is to raise z 1 along a horizontal line holding z 2 constant at a low level. When z 1 crosses the z * 1 threshold, production of intermediate 1 switches from North to South and the procurement cost to the firm changes
At the same time, the implicit markup on the intermediate rises from (1−β) to (1−β/2). Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of costs as a function of a part's maturity and sourcing location. By definition, to the right of the z * threshold the advantages of South production dominate the production inefficiency. 13 The firm can only be indifferent between sourcing an intermediate in North or South if the higher markup in South is compensated for by a higher procurement cost. Hence, it must be the case that M C S (z * ) = 2c S > c N and the marginal procurement cost of the intermediate rises when sourcing switches from North to South. Immediately after a switch the firm will substitute away from the intermediate. However, although ex-post procurement costs are higher in South, total profitability including the ex-ante payment is higher. The greater difficulty of substituting away from South-sourced parts leads to a larger quasi-rent for these parts than in the case without interdependent demand. It encourages both the supplier and the firm to invest more in the production of South-sourced parts, making them already profitable at lower maturity levels. 14 While α < β facilitates offshoring of the first part, it makes it more difficult to offshore all parts. The entire (S,S) area lies in a subset of the top-right quadrant defined by the benchmark black lines. South production of the second part happens unambiguously at a more mature stage than it would for independent goods. There is a delay before sourcing of the second part switches to South as the maturity of the first part has to mature sufficiently for its marginal procurement cost in South to fall below its original marginal cost in North. This delaying effect is more pronounced for lower values of α. The section of the z * 1 threshold that separates the (N,S) and (S,S) areas at the top is a function of the maturity of the second part which is already produced in South and of the ease of substitution between the parts. For a given z 2 it is more difficult to offshore part 1 the lower is α. Better substitutes lowers the derived demand for part 13 The elasticity of the final good demand and the production function will influence the trade-off, as well as the maturity levels of other parts already produced in South.
14 Another way to see this is through the relative impact on intermediates. The equilibrium price for the final product rises after a switch and consumers will substitute away from it. If α = β, substitution by the firm and consumers balance out leaving demand for North-sourced intermediates unaffected. To find the maturity threshold, the firm only needs to equate the markup gain and cost increase for the affected part. If α < β, the consumer's substitution dominates and the lower output for other intermediates raises the share of the switched part in profit. Because the profit margin is greater for South-sourced part, the lower α parameter increases profits with South sourcing.
15 The segment is found by equating π(S, N ) = π(N, S) using the profit expression in equation (9) and solving for the z * 1 threshold. Because the two z values enter symmetrically on either side, the equation has a unique solution at z * 1 (z2) = z2. 1 which makes it easier to overcome its temporary increase in marginal procurement cost when it moves to South.
For a given α, the sign of ∂z * 1 /∂z 2 depends on the sign of α. If α > 0 and the two parts are substitutes (yellow line), the threshold slopes away from the black line.
Higher maturity of part 2 makes it more difficult to offshore part 1. This is because the substitution away from part 1 is not sufficient to overcome the higher demand for part 1 induced by the lower cost of the final good when z 2 is higher. In contrast, if α < 0 and intermediates are complements (blue line) offshoring part 1 becomes easier for a higher z 2 . The cost share for the expensive part 1 is is increasing in z 2 and thus final demand and derived demand for part 1 is decreasing in z 2 .
A dynamic interpretation
We derived the optimal sourcing configuration conditional on a vector of maturities and then we discussed how the equilibrium configuration varies over the (z 1 , z 2 ) space and how it depends on the α parameter. Now, we characterize how the sourcing equilibrium evolves when maturities evolve. In a dynamic interpretation, it is intuitive to view successive z-vectors as weakly-increasing and we derive a number of properties for the successive sourcing equilibria.
The first result holds all K − 1 maturities constant and traces the sourcing equilibria when only z k varies.
Proposition 1 Given the skill intensity of all other parts, there exists a z * k threshold such that part k should be produced in North if z k < z * k and in South if z k ≥ z * k , with South production involving incomplete contracts.
This result generalizes the equilibrium in Antràs (2005) to the case with interdependent intermediates. The key step in the proof is to show that ∂π(k ∈ S)/∂z k > 0 while ∂π(k ∈ N )/∂z k = 0, holding the sourcing of other parts fixed. Hence, as z k rises, profits with k in South will at some point dominate. The possibility of changing the sourcing of other parts can never overturn this result. Details are in the Appendix.
Note that the thresholds in Proposition 1 are functions of the maturities of other parts. It is possible that after sourcing of intermediate k has optimally moved to South at a particular z k > z * k value, a sufficient increase in maturity of another part might change the optimal sourcing of intermediate k back to North. This can happen when another part passes k in terms of maturity and they switch sourcing locations. When parts are substitutes, it is even possible that an increase in the maturity of the most mature part forces optimal sourcing of another (less-mature) South-sourced part back to North. 16 A second result establishes that Corollary 2 With incomplete contracts in South, it is never optimal to switch two or more parts to South simultaneously, even when they are of the same skill intensity.
There does not exist any maturity vector such that the firm is indifferent between π(n * S ) and π(n * S + 2). If this were true, a small increase in one part's maturity could lead to an increase of the number of parts sourced in South by more than one. The proof is also in the Appendix.
Taken together, these results indicate that the succession of equilibria imply a product-life cycle for each intermediate: parts with low z levels are produced in North, while mature parts are offshored. As z k increases, at some point it crosses a threshold and production of part k switches from North to South. Moreover, the optimal sourcing of other parts might change as a result. A North to South switch by part k cannot trigger North to South sourcing changes for other parts with constant maturity, but a sufficiently large increase in the maturity of a South-sourced part might induce a North to South switch for a complementary part. An increase in z k might lead to a South to North sourcing change for other (constant) intermediates if k moves up in the part ordering or if parts are substitutes.
A third result establishes that the maturity thresholds for successive intermediates are increasing for parts that are substitutes, suggesting that the offshoring process is slowing down. For such a characterization to have a clear interpretation, intermediates must be unambiguously ranked by maturity. We assume that the high-skill input intensity of intermediates is increasing in the order k, i.e. at all times z 1 ≥ z 2 ≥ ... ≥ z K , without any restriction on the differences between subsequent z's. Lower ranked intermediates start maturing sooner and reach any specific z value before higher ranked intermediates. Higher ranked intermediates might catch up, but they can never surpass them.
We already established that intermediates will switch from North to South one by one in the order of the k ranking. The main question is then, how does the interdependence of sourcing decisions influences the maturity threshold at which parts are offshored?
We already discussed in the two-intermediate case of Figure 2 that the first part is offshored at a lower maturity threshold with interdependence, compared to the independent sourcing case. This generalizes to the case of K intermediates.
Additional parts produced in North do not affect the sourcing decision of the first part. The offshoring process thus gets started more easily if the trade friction takes the form of an incomplete contract in South countries. But once the process has started, how quickly does it spread to successive parts?
With only two intermediates, the second intermediate switches to South production at a higher level of maturity than intermediate 1. In the area below the 45-degree line, where the maturity ranking is constant, z * 1 < z * 2 in Figure 2 . Comparing the thresholds for subsequent intermediates is more complicated if K > 2 as they depend on the maturity levels of all parts already produced in South. It is even possible that intermediate k switches sourcing without a change in its own z k index.
When intermediates are substitutes, we can still establish the following general result.
Proposition 3 If production in South involves incomplete contracts and z k ≥ z k+1 for all k, the sourcing thresholds that make the firm indifferent between North and South sourcing of intermediates k and k + 1 satisfy z
The proof is in the Appendix and we also illustrate there why the result does not extend to the case of α < 0.
The intuition is as follows. After an initial dip in output when an additional part switches to South, output is generally increasing in the maturity of parts in South. The z * k+1 threshold will be crossed at a higher output level than threshold z * k was. At this higher output level, switching sourcing of an additional part to South is more difficult because its marginal cost rises temporarily after the switch. It will thus require a higher maturity level until it is profitable.
If parts are substitutes this holds generally. If parts are complements, an alternative pattern is possible in extreme circumstances. If the maturity of South-sourced parts rises sufficiently between the offshoring of part k and k + 1, it can raise the total quasi-rent that part k + 1 can hold-up so much that it is optimally offshored already at a maturity threshold lower than z * k . This can only happen if the firm is unable to substitute away from the more expensive parts and if the average maturity of inframarginal parts rises very much. It does make Proposition 3 only hold in general for α > 0.
These effects can be quantitatively important. The z threshold to offshore the first part in Figure 2 was 0.145 (for α = 0.1), while the second part was never offshored before its maturity reached 0.22. The difference between the two thresholds is even larger for lower values of α and for higher α values the z * 2 threshold is increasing in the maturity of the South-sourced part 1. goes from 0 to 1 before any other part starts maturing, followed by z 2 going all the way from 0 to 1 before the remaining parts mature, etc.
The horizontal grey line is for α = β = 0.8, in which case sourcing of all intermediates is decided independently and the thresholds are the same for all intermediatescfr. the black straight lines in Figure 2 . For lower α's, successive thresholds are always higher indicating a slow-down in outsourcing. Higher ranked parts need to mature further before they can be profitably produced in South. The pattern was the same for other modeling choices that we tried for the maturity progression, e.g. linear maturing with higher ranked intermediates starting with a constant advance and concave rate of maturing where parts are converging in maturity.
To verify that Proposition 3 does not extend to the case of α < 0, we included a case with maturity bursts that extend to several parts, but not all. Because the thresholds are a declining function ofz S , the maturity of parts already produced in South, a large enough increase inz S between parts k and k + 1 can induce a drop in the maturity threshold, i.e. acceleration in offshoring. This possibility is indicated with the dashed grey line in Figure 4 . 18 3 An alternative model of outsourcing: South production involves a fixed cost
The model
The incomplete contracting approach in the previous section has three disadvantages. The model is relatively complicated. It leads to inconclusive predictions for the relative sourcing thresholds if parts are complements. When parts are substitutes, offshoring is predicted to require ever greater maturity, i.e. become more difficult, which seems counterintuitive in light of the observed patterns in Figure 1 .
The lower wage in South provides an incentive to produce low-skilled inputs there. Without trade frictions all x l would be produced in South if z > 0, making the problem uninteresting. Even a trade friction that is proportional to the variable production cost would lead to an uninteresting problem, as sourcing decisions of all intermediates would be independent events. 19 A simple alternative would be to introduce a fixed cost f for each part that is produced in South. This sequence is generated for α = −10 and assuming the following evolution for the z indices. The first five intermediates mature gradually together, which leads to the usual deceleration. They mature completely to z = 1 before z6 > 0. As a result, part 6 faces a much higherzS than part 5 did, which induces a temporary acceleration, i.e. z * 6 < z * 5 . As this is only possible if the difference inzS is sufficiently large, the parts following 6 will again show deceleration.
Firm behavior
19 Iceberg transportation costs or tariffs would lead to a landed marginal cost for intermediate k that is produced in South equal to c S k = w z k /θ (0 < θ < 1), while the marginal cost of producing y k in North is always unity. Any intermediate with z k > ln(θ/w) would be produced in South irrespective of where other intermediates are produced. In general equilibrium, a non-tradables sector could fix the relative South wage rate and make the ln(θ/w) threshold a constant. For a representative intermediate, Figure 5 illustrates that marginal production and thus also procurement costs are lower when the part is sourced in South. c S k is always below the constant marginal cost of North production, but only when the gap is sufficient to cover the fixed cost will production take place in South, i.e. when the average cost of production is lower in South. In addition to the fixed cost f , the z * threshold is also a function of the optimal output levels under either sourcing mode y N k (z * ) and y S k (z * ), which depend themselves on all parameters in the model, in particular the maturity levels of all parts already produced in South.
Pricing for the final good is unchanged and profits can be derived in the same way as before as
Profit depends on n S , the number of intermediates produced in South, as South production raises fixed costs. It also depends on the average costc which is defined similarly as the M C aggregate before:c
The profit equation nicely illustrates the different roles of the β and α parameters. If all intermediates are produced in North,c = 1 and the z parameters are irrelevant. Optimal quantities and price are determined solely by the number of intermediates and the substitutability of final products. This is because output in the CES production function rises with K and because the equilibrium price-cost ratio equals 1/β. When at least one intermediate is sourced from South, the average marginal production cost declines (c < 1), equilibrium output is raised, and variable profits rise. Thec average is declining in the z index of a South-sourced intermediate, but the α parameter also plays a role now.
Implicitly, profit vary withz, which is defined asc = wz, mirroring c S k = w z k . It is the appropriately weighted average maturity of parts and determines variable cost savings from South production. It differs from the simple unweighted averagē z for two reasons. First, for components sourced in North the z value used in thẽ c average is 0 because North production cost always remains at w N = w 0 = 1. Second, the relative weight of intermediates depends on α, which determines the substitution elasticity in production. If α > 0, intermediates are substitutes and z will be higher than the unweighted average. Substitution towards South-sourced intermediates with high z raises their weight in the marginal cost of the final good and their z's will receive a higher weight in thez aggregate as well. This effect is stronger if substitution between intermediates is easier (larger α). If α < 0 and intermediates are complements, the cost share of intermediates from North will be more than proportional andz will be lower than the unweighted average.
Comparing profit equation (10) to the one for the incomplete contracting model, in equation (9), reveals three differences. 20 First, there are the explicit fixed costs associated with South production. Second, the firm now considers the production costs c s rather than the procurement costs M C s for intermediates produced in South. Without rent sharing and inefficient (noncooperative) input choices, the costs considered by the firm to determine y * are the lower production costs, rather than its own expenditures, i.e.
w N x h and the fraction of the rent shared with the South supplier in the incomplete contracts case.
Third, in the current case the implicit markup on the cost of intermediates is a uniform (1 − β). In the incomplete contracting place, this multiplier only applies to intermediates produced in North, with a higher markup (1 − β/2) applied to intermediates sourced in South. These come from the ex-ante payment for these intermediates that raises profits and show up as a higher equilibrium markup. Without a fraction of the profits received ex ante, the firm's profits are now more responsive 20 To facilitate comparison, we re-write equation (10) in the same form as (9):
to price increases and the equilibrium price markup will be lower.
Equilibrium
Conditional on the vector of maturities of all intermediates, the sourcing equilibrium is again found by comparing profits under all possible configurations. As in the incomplete contracting model, it is again optimal to offshore intermediates in the order of their maturity, indexed by k. The equilibrium can again be characterized by the number of intermediates sourced in South.
The first term in the profit equation (10), the variable profit, is monotonically decreasing inc, which is itself a decreasing function of n S . Variable profits are thus increasing in n S , which is intuitive. The second term in (10), the sum of fixed costs, increases linearly in n S . In equilibrium, intermediates will be offshored until the variable cost savings are outweighed by the additional fixed cost. For any two sourcing configurations, there is an implicit threshold for the change in marginal costc that makes the firm indifferent between the two configurations. The profit comparison boils down tõ c(n S )
As before, we need to evaluate profits for all possible n S ∈ {1, ..., K} to find the optimum. We illustrate in the next section that it is important to also compare sourcing configurations that differ by more than one part, e.g. n k and n k+2 .
All possible equilibria in the two-intermediate case
For a final good that is made up of only two intermediates, we again illustrate graphically the sourcing equilibria for all points in (z 1 , z 2 ) space. The two maturity thresholds z * 1 (z 2 ) and z * 2 (z 1 ) partition the space into four sourcing configurations which is illustrated for different values of α in Figure 6 . If α < β, the threshold z * 1 (z 2 ) at which the firm is indifferent to source intermediate 1 from North or South is a weakly decreasing function of the maturity level of the second intermediate. Equation (11) 
Intermediate 2 in South [c
The exponents areα = −α/(1 − α),β = −β/(1 − β), andK = 2 −β /(1 − β) is a scaling term. Each of the equations (12)- (14) corresponds to a segment of the downward-sloping line that defines the z * 1 threshold in Figure 6 . The three segments of the z * 1 threshold in Figure 2 for the incomplete contracting case can be defined similarly, but the algebra is more involved.
Equation (12) In equation (13) total marginal cost of the final good is lower and equilibrium output higher. As long as α < β substitution away from the relatively more expensive intermediate 1 will not be strong enough to overturn the higher derived demand for intermediate 1. At a higher production volume y * 1 it is easier to recover the fixed costs of South sourcing, which thus happens at lower z * 1 . Moreover, the z * 1 threshold depends directly on z 2 . Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (13) demonstrates that ∂z * 1 (z 2 )/∂z 2 < 0. The mechanism leading to a lower z * 1 if intermediate 2 is produced in South is reinforced with higher z 2 . The border separating the (N,S) and (S,S) areas thus lays to the left of the vertical segment and is downward-sloping.
Finally, equation (14) The lines in Figure 6 partition the space into four areas with a different optimal sourcing configuration. Differently colored lines correspond to different values of the α parameter, which governs the substitutability of intermediates, holding constant the β parameter, which governs the substitutability of final products.
The maturity threshold to offshore the first component is higher if α is low.
Moving production of one intermediate to South has a smaller effect on profits if α
21 If α > 0,α < 0 and all (c S )α terms are larger than one. β > α further implies thatβ/α > 1 and the first term in equation (13) has to be lower than the corresponding term in (12) for the left hand sides of both equations to equalize. Withα < 0 this happens if z * 1 is lower. If α < 0, the (c S )α terms are smaller than one, but the exponentβ/α turns negative. The first term in equation (13) now has to be greater than the corresponding term in (12), but this again means a lower z * 1 . 22 In the general case with K intermediates, even more simultaneous switches are possible if z values for more parts are similar as well. In the incomplete contracting model, the equivalent of equation (14) is low because the firm cannot substitute as easily away from the expensive Northsourced intermediate as consumers can substitute between final goods. Output will not rise very much, making it harder to recover fixed costs and offshoring will only start at higher maturity levels.
The same difficulty to substitute away from the expensive intermediate raises its derived demand when another intermediate is already produced in South. This now has the opposite effect, making it easier to recover the fixed cost of offshoring an additional intermediate. This effect only goes so far, as for α < 0 intermediates are complements and the cost of the final good rises and its quantity falls introducing an opposing effect. The segment of the z * 2 threshold separating the (S,N) and (S,S) areas is lowest for α close to zero. In any case, the second intermediate is offshored at a lower maturity level than the first, an acceleration in the offshoring process.
In sum, the difficulty of substituting between intermediates (low α) works as a complementarity. It increases the incentive to produce intermediates in the same place. The first effect is to delay offshoring of the first intermediate. The second effect is to accelerate offshoring of part 2 when part 1 is already produced in South.
The third effect is to enlarge the segment of the threshold that separates the (N,N) and (S,S) areas.
A dynamic interpretation
We now adopt the same dynamic interpretation as before, i.e. we characterize how the the sourcing configuration changes when maturities increase. First holding the maturities of all other intermediates constant, the maturing of one intermediate also leads to a production life-cycle in the model with fixed costs:
Proposition 4 Given the skill intensity of all other parts, there exists a z * k threshold such that part k should be produced in North if z k < z * k and in South if z k ≥ z * k , with South production incurring a fixed cost.
The equilibrium sourcing pattern satisfies the following property which was not the case for the incomplete contracting model:
Corollary 5 Once a part is sourced from South, no increase in the skill intensity of other parts will be able to switch optimal production of the part back to North.
Proofs for both results are in the Appendix. Proposition 4 follows just like Proposition 1 from the slope of the profit derivative: ∂π(k ∈ S)/∂z k > 0. Corollary 5 follows from the key property that ∂ 2 π(k ∈ S)/∂z k ∂c < 0. Both derivatives hold conditional on the sourcing pattern of the other parts and we demonstrate that no change in their sourcing can overturn the result, while still be profitable. The last For the third result we assume again that the ordering is preserved when intermediates mature. The pattern is the exact opposite from the incomplete contracting model and it holds for all possible values of the α parameter.
Proposition 6 If production in South involves a fixed cost and z k ≥ z k+1 for all k, the sourcing thresholds that make the firm indifferent between North and South sourcing of intermediates k and k + 1 satisfy z * k ≥ z * k+1 .
With fixed costs, maturity thresholds for successive intermediates are unambiguously decreasing. When one intermediate is offshored, the marginal cost of the final product declines and its equilibrium output rises. Because α < β the derived demand for each intermediate is certain to increase, which makes it easier to recover the fixed costs of South production for any intermediates still produced in North.
The interdependence of demand for different intermediates leads unambiguously to an acceleration in offshoring, i.e. later maturing intermediates make the switch at a lower level of maturity. 23 This effect can be quantitatively important. In the two-23 Note that there is no scope for forward looking behavior by the firm. Each decision is optimal given the exogenous evolution of the z indices. Variation in z * thresholds for different parts is not the result of myopic behavior as the firm cannot influence any of the parameters that determine the thresholds.
intermediate case of Figure 6 with α = 0.1 (red line), the share of low-skill inputs in the first intermediate has to exceed 0.27 before it can be profitably sourced from South. The z * 2 threshold for the second part to switch sourcing as well immediately falls to 0.11 when intermediate one is produced in South. If z 1 were to rise to 0.5, the z * 2 threshold would decline further to 0.04. Only one seventh of z * 1 . The maturity threshold at which successive intermediates switch optimal production to South in the case of 10 intermediates and with the same sequential maturing as in Figure 4 is illustrated in Figure 7 . In the benchmark case of α = β = 0.8 thresholds are constant, as before, but for lower α's they are weakly declining in the k ordering. This can be seen best for α = 0.65. For even lower α's the simultaneous switching becomes very important, leading to z * = 1 for several parts, but still lower thresholds for later parts. When demands are interrelated, the two alternative ways we modeled trade friction produced starkly different predictions on the maturity levels at which successive intermediates are first offshored. When South production involves incomplete contracts, intermediates that mature sooner are first produced abroad at lower maturity levels than intermediates that mature later, barring some special cases. The reverse holds if South production involves fixed costs.
One could say that offshoring is slowing down in the first model, as the maturity levels at which intermediates are first offshored rise over time, while it is accelerating in the second model. These opposing predictions could be tested directly if we observed two pieces of information: the ordering of parts (1, ..., K) and the maturity levels of parts in the first year they are offshored (z * k ). The information on U.S. automotive component imports that we use is from the The sample contains products at the 10-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) classification within the HS870600, HS870701, HS870790, and HS8708 categories. 25 A total of 54 countries record positive exports to the United States for any of these automotive components over the 12 year sample period.
The parts ordering in the theory is intended to represents a particular feature of technology-the relative speed at which different intermediates mature-and it should apply to all countries. We used the method developed by Feenstra and Rose (2000) to construct a unique ranking of parts, using the country-specific ordering in which parts are first exports to the United States as inputs. The method aggregates over the order of initial exports for all countries, with a correction for products that are skipped by some countries, i.e. never exported to the United States.
We cannot derive a proxy for the maturity thresholds directly from the observed export flows. Because the rate of maturing over time is not necessarily constant, the predictions of an accelerating or decelerating offshoring process that we defined in terms of maturity thresholds does not necessarily translate into accelerating or decelerating import flows over time. Our solution is to recover a proxy for maturity from the unit value ratio, i.e. the import price.
We normalize the prices for all 'South' countries by the average price of U.S.
imports from Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom for the same product in the same year. These three countries have high and stable wages over the sample period and their import prices serve as a proxy for the unobserved North price of domestic produced parts. The gap between South and North prices serves as a proxy for the inverse of a part's maturity. 26 If South sourcing only occurs at a very mature stage, this will show up as a low relative import price as the weight on the low-skilled input produced with low wages has become large.
Regression results of this proxy for maturity on the parts ordering are reported in Table 1 . We only use the price gap for the first year that a country exports a part to the United States. To facilitate the interpretation we use the negative of the logarithm of relative prices as dependent variable in the regressions and we include country and year fixed effects to control for the general effect of wage differences.
While it is a strong assumption to use the cardinality of the parts ranking as explanatory variable, it serves the illustrative purpose. We also include results where the parts index is interacted with the simple average of six governance measures compiled annually by the World Bank. 27
A number of findings stand out. First, the overall relationship between the proxy 25 While sufficient for our illustrative purpose, it only represents approximately one half of all automotive component imports. The remainder is spread over sub-categories of automotive components within other broad product classes, e.g. HS840820 is "diesel engines for motor vehicles," or Notes: A unit of observation is a 10-digit automotive part imported into the Unites States for the first time by a particular country. P S is the unit value for that import flow and it is normalized by the average unit value of Japan, Germany, and the U.K. for the same part in that year. The part index ranks all components in the average order they are first exported to the United States, constructed as in Feenstra and Rose (2000) , and it is the same for all exporting countries. Column (4) includes only Canada, France, and Mexico. * * * , * * , * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
for z * k and the parts ordering is positive, suggesting that offshoring is slowing down. This pattern cannot be generated by a model with only fixed costs as a trade friction to delay parts shifting to South. Both frictions might play a role, but the empirical pattern on the maturity thresholds suggests that incomplete contracts are especially important.
Second, the positive relationship between the ordering and the maturity is weakened by the quality of governance in the country. It suggests the incomplete contracting model is less dominant for countries with better governance. An alternative interpretation is that assemblers take advantage of better governance situations to increase the substitutability of their parts, i.e. be less rigid in their sourcing relationships, which raises the α parameter in the production function and weakens linkage between parts.
Classifying countries into three groups based on the quality of governance leads to the same finding. The negative relationship between the parts ordering and maturity is strongest if governance is bad. Even for the subset of countries with the best governance, the correlation is still positive, but the coefficient becomes HS700721 is "Safety glass (laminated) for vehicles."
26 In the theory this is direct because ln AC N /AC S = −z ln w. 27 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. insignificant if the regression is run separately for each group and time dummies vary.
Finally, in the last column the regression is limited to three countries with excellent or good governance and with a well developed automotive sector: Canada, France, and Mexico. The parameter estimate turns negative here. For these three countries the empirical pattern is consistent with a model of complete contracts and only fixed costs delaying international sourcing of parts.
Conclusions
A model with only final goods can generate the intuitive predictions that goods need to reach a maturity threshold before they are offshored and that goods maturing more slowly are offshored later. The interaction of sourcing decisions for intermediates that are assembled into the same final good generates some more surprising predictions.
Foremost, for many predictions it matters crucially how costs associated with producing in a low-wage location are modeled. First, intermediates that mature at similar speeds are offshored jointly if South production requires a fixed cost, but never if contracts with South suppliers are incomplete. Second, in the fixed cost model offshoring starts later than would be the case for independent products, i.e. at a higher maturity level, but it starts earlier in the incomplete contracting model. Third, offshoring of successive intermediates is accelerating in the fixed cost model, i.e. happening at ever lower maturity levels, but unambiguously slowing down in the incomplete contracting model if intermediates are substitutes.
An illustrative empirical test of this last prediction using data on U.S. automotive parts imports suggests that incomplete contracts are a crucial ingredient to explain the observed patterns. Especially for countries with poor governance, we find that offshoring of parts is slowing down. Automotive components that were first imported in the United States only late in the sample period enter at significantly lower prices than components that entered earlier. We interpret this as having reached a higher level of maturity. Only for a few countries with good governance and mature automotive sectors is the pattern consistent with a model without incomplete contracts and only fixed costs.
Two broader implications of distinguishing between final goods and intermediates are worth highlighting. First, while we focus on the interrelation of sourcing decisions, the division of benefits from trade between the final good producer and individual suppliers also becomes interrelated in our model. It will depend on the substitutability of intermediates and on the rate at which individual parts mature, both of which vary naturally across industries and our model can be used to study the implications. For example, much of the cost-saving on one intermediate might not benefit its particular supplier, see Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010) for an illustration using the Apple iPod.
Second, the dependency of the maturity threshold of one part on the maturity and sourcing location of other parts implies that the range of products that a country produces is not constant. If sourcing decisions were independent, the productivityadjusted wage level would fully determine the maturity level for which a product could be profitably produced in each country. As products mature, their production would move from country to country in the order of their (productivity-adjusted) wage, always switching at the same maturity level. In contrast, our model predicts that at any given time countries will produce products over a range of maturity levels that overlap with that of other countries. The interrelation of demand for intermediates thus weakens the usual prediction of specialization according to comparative advantage.
In future work, we intend to derive a broader range of predictions from an extended model with multiple countries. If they can be ranked by unit cost the model would predict sequential sourcing chains. Combining information on wage and productivity differences, we could test predictions on offshoring order, speed, and interdependence. The acceleration or deceleration in offshoring could be evaluated for industries that differ in the substitutability of intermediates. Industries also differ in the importance of differentiated inputs, which according to Nunn (2007) is likely to correlate with the importance of incomplete contracts. A testable prediction of our model is then that offshoring is more likely to slow down over time in industries relying more on differentiated inputs.
It allows for the possibility that M L differs from M L . If simultaneous switching were indeed optimal, it implies that both profits above are higher than π(S, N, M L ) at
Note that we can write the profit equation for any sourcing configuration as
always using the appropriate marginal costs and mark-ups for the chosen sourcing configuration m k , m k+1 , and M L : M C j = 1 and τ j = 1 if m j = N and M C j = w z j and τ j = 1/2 if m j = S. The aggregates are then defined as (
Given that the mark-up is a sum of K terms, we can decompose it linearly in the
Next, we substitute in the profit definition
and re-write it using the earlier equalities as we evaluate the expressions at z * k and
This expression is increasing in x. The concavity of the 1/y(•) function makes that at x = 1 we can sign the right-hand term: 28
These calculations indicate that at z * k and z * k+1 the firm would make higher profits if only k were sourced in North and k + 1 in South, rather than having both parts sourced in the same location. This contradicts the optimality of a simultaneous switch of both parts.
Proposition 3
The assumption that z k+1 ≤ z k and the result in Corollary 2 that parts will not switch sourcing at the same time, guarantees that part k will already be produced in South when part z k+1 reaches its sourcing threshold. The zero profit condition that pins down z * k+1 is the following
Applying the implicit function theorem to the above equation reveals that sign(∂z * k+1 /∂z S ) = sign(α). When α > 0, the minimum z * k+1 is achieved at the minimumz S . By definition, z S is the average z j for all parts j = 1, ..., k already sourced from South (with necessarily z j ≥ z * j and, recall, z j ≥ z k+1 ). Therefore, the lowest possiblez S will be z * k+1 itself, which is achieved only if z 1 = ... = z k = z * k+1 . It must be the case that
We illustrate why the proposition might not hold down when α < 0. Now the minimum z * k+1 is achieved atz S = 1. Use π(m k , m k+1 ,z S ) to denote the profit function when parts k and k + 1 are produced in m k and m k+1 and the k − 1 parts (out of K − 2) that are produced in South are characterized byz S . The lowest possible threshold for z * k+1 is thus defined as π(S, N, 1) = π(S, S, 1), with also z k = 1, 28 This can be seen from the following inequality:
The highest possible threshold for z * k is achieved whenz S = z * k and defined by π (N, N, 
Note that π(S, N, 1), the left hand side of [z * k+1 ], is always larger than π(S, N, z * k ), the right hand side of
As in the previous case for α > 0, we verify whether z * k+1 ≥ z * k as this implies directly that in all situations z * k+1 ≥ z * k . We do this by evaluating the equality that defines z * k+1 at z k+1 = z * k . Because π(S, S, 1) is increasing in z k+1 , we know that if [π(S, N, 1) − π(S, S, 1)] z k+1 =z * k ≥ 0 the sourcing threshold for part k + 1 must be higher than this value, and thus z * k+1 ≥ z * k ≥ z * k . We use the same approach as for the proof of Corollary 2 in Appendix A.3. Profits can be written as the product of output and a mark-up term. Because the latter is a sum over all parts, it can be re-written as the combination of the mark-ups in three different configurations:
Substituting in the above two equalities, we obtain
and thus
, which is increasing in x because y(S, N, z * k ) < y(N, N, z * k ). 29 Similar to Appendix A.3, the right-hand side is positive when x = 1. Hence, for x → 1 it will be true that π(S, S, 1) − π(S, N, 1)] z k+1 =z * k > 1 and the prediction Proposition 6 will still hold. Recall that x is defined as
, which is the inverse of the profit gap when the maturities of all k South sourced parts increases from z * k to 1. If this difference is small, the proposition will still hold and z * k+1 ≥ z * k . On the contrary, if the profit difference is large, there might be cases where z * k+1 < z * k . The probability of this happening is lower when z * k is already high.
Appendix II Proofs for the fixed cost model
Proposition 4 The proof of Proposition 4 follows the same logic as that of Proposition 1. At z k = 0, the fixed costs involved in South production guarantee that π(N,
and intermediate k is produced in North. We limit attention to the case where at z k = 1 the profits
production is optimal at some maturity level. 30 Because ∂π(N, M L )/∂z k = 0 and
the difference π(N, M L ) − π(S, M L ) declines monotonically with z k . There must be one and only one cutoff z * k (z L , M L ) for part k such that profit maximization dictates: if z k < z * k , part k is produced in North and in South if z k ≥ z * k . Even when M L is not fixed, a change in the sourcing of other parts can never make North sourcing of k profitable again if z k exceeds the threshold that makes South production more profitable than the highest possible profit with part k in North. Hence, for any z k < z * k , part k will be produced in North; while for any z k ≥ z * k , part k is produced is South.
Corollary 5
To prove Corollary 5, we only need to show that once part k is produced in South even a change in z L , possibly accompanied with a change in M L , will not make North production of part k profitable again either. Due to the series of bilateral contracts, a change in M L only enters the above profit functions through its effect onc 2. π(S, M A ) cuts π(S, M B ) at z * * ∈ (z * k (z L , M B ), 1): then z * k (z L , M B ) is the cutoff for component k, and M B is chosen when z k is very small until z k reaches z * * .
3. π(S, M A ) cuts π(S, M B ) at z * * * ∈ (0, z * k (z L , M B )): then z * * * is the relevant cutoff value for component k. M B is chosen while z k is relatively small and k is produced in North. When z k reaches the cutoff point, not only component k is switched to South production, but also all other parts are now produced according to M A , which sources more other components from South as well.
In each case, once the lower variable cost combination M A is chosen, M B cannot dominate M A with further increase in z k , which is Corollary 5.
Proposition 6
Given the assumption that the component index order is fixed, it generally has to be true that if component k is offshored, any component with index l < k (and thus with lower skill intensity) should be offshored as well. Otherwise, the firm can raise profits by switching k to North and produce the lower index component in South instead. It would incur the same fixed costs, but lower variable cost.
There are two possibilities for part k+1. It will either be offshored first when part k is already produced in South, or both parts can switch sourcing simultaneously.
In the latter case, z * k+1 ≤ z * k is directly satisfied by the definition of the index order. We only need to show that the same inequality holds in the first case, when component k is already sourced from South when k + 1 first moves there. When If α < 0, the inverse inequalities apply, (c S k+ ) −α < (c * ) −α < (c N ) −α , but the g(x) function becomes concave leading to the same overall inequality.
Multiplying both sides by (1 − β)K −β /α and adding 2f + 2I L f , we can rewrite the inequality as
The substitution in the second line strengthens the inequality, as indicated with the definition of z * k . The definition of z * k itself allows the elimination of the first terms on both sides altogether. Hence we find that the sufficient condition holds with strict inequality.
In other words, when z k+1 = z * k , producing part k + 1 in South generates higher profit than producing it at North. This must mean that the actual cutoff value z * k+1 ≤ z * k .
